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Abstract
Land fragmentation, in which a single farm household operates more than one separate
piece of land, is a significant issue in Vietnamese agriculture, especially in the North. For
the whole country, there are about 75 million plots of land, an average of 7-8 plots per
farm household. Such fragmentation can be seen to have negative and positive benefits
for farm households and the community generally. The negative impacts can be reduced
mechanisation, higher costs, loss of land due to boundaries, increased negative
externalities, and more limited application of new technologies. On the other hand, land
fragmentation may have some benefits to farmers such as spreading output risk, seasonal
labour use, and crop diversification. Comparative static analysis and analysis of survey
data have led to the conclusion that small sized farms are likely to be more fragmented
and the number of plots held by a household is not a significant determinant of yield and
output risk spreading but is a significant factor in crop diversification. Policies which
allow the appropriate opportunity cost of labour to be reflected at the farm level may
provide appropriate incentives to trigger farm size change and land consolidation.
Policies which tip the benefits in favour of fewer and larger plots such as strong and
effective research and development, an active extension system and strong administrative
management may also lead to land consolidation and thus allow some of the benefits
which will accrue to the economy more generally to be obtained by farmers.
Introduction
Land fragmentation where “a single farm consists of numerous parcels, often
scattered over a wide area” (Binns 1950) is a common phenomenon and one of the
important features of agriculture in many countries, especially in developing
countries. For example, land fragmentation is present in Jordan, Ghana, Rwanda and
China (Blarel et al. 1992; Jabarin and Epplin 1994; Nguyen et al. 1996; Wan and
Cheng 2001) Fragmentation is a phenomenon of agriculture not only in Asia, and
Africa, but in European countries as well (Sabates-Wheeler 2002). In Vietnam, land
fragmentation is common especially in the North. For the whole country, there are
about 75 million parcels of land, an average of 7-8 plots per farm household (Marsh
and MacAulay 2002). Land fragmentation is considered an impediment to efficient
crop production which is the reason why many countries have implemented policies
encouraging land consolidation. Such policies have been implemented in Kenya,
Tanzania, Rwanda (Blarel et al. 1992), Albania, Bulgaria (Lusho and Papa 1998;
Sabates-Wheeler 2002) and are now being considered in Vietnam. In the larger
context, if land fragmentation means that more labour and other resources are used
than is necessary and that these resources can be used more effectively elsewhere in
the economy, then there is likely to be an overall economic gain from reduced
fragmentation. However, even though land fragmentation may have negative impacts
on farms and the overall economy, there are reasons why it may be beneficial to
farmers so that they attempt to keep some degree of fragmentation.  Some of these2
issues will be examined.
The aim of the paper is to investigate the current situation of land fragmentation in the
North of Vietnam, its effects and relationship to crop productivity. Comparative static
analysis approaches are proposed to examine the relationship between land
fragmentation and farm size, agricultural production ability, off-farm jobs, and the
amount of land rented in and out. The role of land fragmentation in spreading output
risk is also considered. In order to work toward these objectives, the specific issues to
be examined are: (1) what is the level of land fragmentation in the North of
Vietnam;(2) whether land fragmentation does or does not have an effect on crop
productivity; (3) whether land fragmentation does or does not reduce output risks of
crop production; and (4) which policies are needed to facilitate land consolidation in
the future.
The paper is organised as follows. In section stet some background to Vietnamese
agriculture and the issue of land fragmentation in the North of Vietnam is presented.
Causes, advantages and disadvantages of land fragmentation are discussed in section
three. Evidence of land fragmentation in the North of Vietnam and its relationship to
crop productivity, farm size and other factors are mentioned in section four. The
comparative static analysis is presented in section five. In sections six and seven
empirical models are proposed which allow the examination of effects of land
fragmentation on crop productivity and diversification and risk spreading.
Conclusions and policy implications are drawn in the last section.
Background
Vietnam started on its path of overall economic reforms with the introduction of the
Doi Moi (renovation) policy in 1986. The Doi Moi was launched and aimed to shift
the Vietnamese economy from a central planning model to a largely market based
one. In the agricultural sector, the Resolution 10 of the Politburo of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam in 1988, which was commonly known
as Khoan 10 (Contract 10) system, was a radical reform. The main ideas of this policy
were to recognise the farm household as an autonomous economic unit and free
markets for inputs and outputs as well as the means of production (except land),
liberalise prices, provide longer terms for land use rights and more freedom for
farmers in choosing the crops to be produced, reduce land use tax, and the demise of
the agricultural cooperatives (Pingali and Xuan 1992; Hung and Murata 2001;
Nakachi 2001; Marsh and MacAulay 2002; Ministry of Agriculture and Rural
Development 2002). Under the Khoan 10 policy, farmers were allocated land for
stable use for 15 years and assigned ‘contract levels’ for inputs used, outputs, and
labour which was stable for five years. Since then, most of the means of production
(machines, buffaloes, cattle and agricultural instruments) have been recognised as
privately owned. This policy was the main factor that mobilised farmers to use
production resources more efficiently. Another component of this policy was that the
income of farmers depended on how many stages they were responsible for, but it
could not be less than 40 percent of total production output (Ministry of Agriculture
and Rural Development 2000). This meant that labour was transferred from hired
labour to self-employed, which also mobilised farmers to use all their capacity. Since
then, Vietnam’s agriculture has entered a new and relatively more stable development3
stage. However, the duration of land allocation was short and other land use rights
still were not supported by the legal system (Nakachi 2001). This meant that farmers
did not have  incentives for long-term investment in their land.
The 1993 Land Law was enacted in response to the above mentioned demands. Under
the Land Law, farmers were allocated land for long term and stable use and they were
granted five rights of land use including the rights of transfer, exchange, lease,
inheritance and mortgage. The duration of land allocation was 20 years for land used
for annual crops and aquaculture, and 50 years for land used for perennial crops and it
could be renewed if the holder still had a need for the land (Ministry of Agriculture
and Rural Development 2000). Thus, this could allow the state to make adjustments
or a reallocation (Kerkvliet 2000). The Land Law also put a ceiling on the land areas
allocated to farm households. The limit for annual crop land was two hectares in the
central and northern provinces and three hectares in the southern provinces. For
perennial crop land the land limit was 10 hectares in communes with flat fields and 30
hectares in midland or mountainous communes (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural
Development 2000; Marsh and MacAulay 2002). Actually, these limits were not
constraints in many provinces in the deltas, especially in the Red River Delta. In these
areas, farmers were not concerned about land limits because their land holdings were
much lower than this ceiling
1.
The most important principle of the land allocation was to maintain equality, but there
were different procedures in different provinces. Commonly, many localities in the
north allocated a certain amount of land to each Dinh Suat (per capita equivalent)
2
(Hung Yen People's Committee 2002). Moreover, land was allocated not only on the
basis of the number of household members (per capita equivalent) but also on the
basis of social policies. Households with members who had been wounded or had
died during the wars, received an additional amount of land (Kerkvliet 2000). For
example, in Hung Yen province the additional amount of land was one sao
3 (360 m
2)
for each wounded solder and martyr (Hung Yen People's Committee 2002). In
addition, households with members who had retired from government organizations
or the state-owned enterprises could receive an additional amount of land which was
dependent on the availability of land in the commune
4. Other conditions that were
also taken into consideration for the amount of land allocated were land quality, the
irrigation system, distance to plots, and capacity for crop rotation. In Vietnam, annual
crop land was divided into six categories
5. Therefore, in order to maintain the
principle of equality each household may have plots with different categories,
locations and quality of land. As a result, a household had a number of plots, often
scattered over a wide area. For example, in the Red River Delta each farm household,
on average, had eight or nine plots often less than 200 to 500 m
2 each (World Bank in
                                                
1 In 1998, average farm size was 0.25 and 1.18 hectares in the Red River and Mekong River Delta,
respectively.
2 A Dinh Suat (per capita equivalent) is generally a person in the agricultural population.
3 Sao is a common unit of land areas in the north of Vietnam.
4 In Vietnam, people who work in private companies do not usually receive a pension or other payment
when they retire.
5 In the upland and mountainous areas, land was more scattered and the number of categories of land
could be more than six.4
Vietnam 1998). That is why land fragmentation is a significant issue in this delta in
particular and in the north and in the north central part of Vietnam in general.
Land allocation in the Central Highlands, the South and some provinces in the
northern mountainous areas was different. Based on historical considerations, in these
areas land was returned to previous ‘owners’. In fact, in these regions land allocation
was not really present as in the Red River Delta. Land cultivated by farmers was
recognised by the government as belonging to them if there were no conflicts over the
land. Farmers were given land use certificates (the Red Book) on the basis of the
actual situation of their fields and negotiation between farmers (Ministry of
Agriculture and Rural Development 2002). This is likely to be one of the reasons why
in these areas (except the northern mountainous areas) land fragmentation is not a
serious problem. However, other social issues have appeared such as landless farmers
and a tenant class. Another issue occurs in the North, especially in the Red River
Delta, where people who were born after the land allocation (1993) have not been
allocated land and the land of people who died after this point of time has not been
withdrawn. This is why some farmers in these areas have requested a re-allocation of
land. However, new land allocation is still not accepted by the central and local
governments (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 2002).
The issue of land fragmentation, which resulted from this ‘equitable’ allocation of
agricultural land, has emerged in recent years. According to data from the Statistical
Register Department, Land Management Office, in 1998, on average, a farm in the
Red River Delta and the Northern Mountainous and Midlands region had seven and
10-20 plots respectively, while this figure for a farm in the Mekong River Delta was
only three parcels (Lan 2001). However, within a region there were different degrees
of land fragmentation. Some locations were more serious, others not.  Data from
42,167 farm households in 27 communes in Hung Yen province show that after the
land allocation was made in 1993, on average a farm had 7.58 plots (Hung Yen
People's Committee 2002). In 1993, land allocations were made to 34,346 farm
households in Kim Son district, Ninh Binh province
6 and resulted in 67,250 plots. On
average, there were only 1.96 plots per household. Some 12,573 households, or 36.6
percent, had only one plot, 13,540 households (39.4%) had two plots, 5,525
households (16.1%) had three plots, 2,542 households (7.4%) had four plots; 142
households (0.4%) had five plots, and 24 households (0.1%) had six plots (Khoa
2003).
During the Doi Moi period, a series of policies and laws especially concerned with
land use in the agricultural sector were issued. The most important policies were the
Ordinance 64/CP (1993) and 02/CP (1994) of the government on the regulation of
agricultural and forestry land allocation. In addition, there were revised versions of
the Land Law in 1998, 2001, and 2003. There were also other policies related directly
to land issues: such as the Ordinance 17/CP (1999) of the government on the
procedure of exchange, transfer, lease, release, heritage, mortgage of land use rights,
and ‘joint capital’
7 by using the value of land use rights; the Resolution 03/NQ-CP
(2000) of the government on the allocation, lease, assignment and accumulation of
land; and the Decision 661/QD-TTg (1998) of the Prime Minister on the task, target,
                                                
6 Hung Yen and Ninh Binh province are both located in the Red River Delta.
7 ‘Joint capital’ means that land user can use land use rights as capital in joint venture arrangements.5
and implementation of the Five Million Hectares Reforestation Programme
(Programme 661). These policies contributed significantly to efficient land use and
stable land relations in Vietnam and the undeniable achievements in the agricultural
and rural sectors during recent years.
In 1998, the government issued a policy to promote the exchange of land plots so as
to encourage larger plot areas. This policy was known as Don Dien, Doi Thua (plot
exchange). Since then, provinces in the North, especially in the Red River Delta, have
established steering committees for conducting pilot studies on plot exchange.
Throughout the whole country, there are 700 communes in 20 provinces where plot
exchanges were and are being implemented, but progress is still slow. In these areas
land was effectively re-allocated to farmers with a target to reduce the number of
plots. In Thanh Hoa province, for example, the number of plots decreased by 51.5
percent after three years implementation of the policy (1998-2001) in 391 communes
in 16 flat field districts of a total 27 districts. On average, the number of plots per
farm household decreased from 7.8 to 3.8 plots (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural
Development 2002). In 1998, three communes were chosen to implement plot
exchange in Hung Yen province. At the end of 2001, the Hung Yen People’s
Committee decided to expand this process to 35 communes in 10 districts. Each
commune was supported by an amount of 20 million Vietnamese Dong (VND) to
organise this work. After implementing the policy, the total number of plots of land
decreased by 57.9 percent from 319,453 to 134,508 plots. The average number of
plots per household decreased from 7.58 to 3.42. Fifty one percent of households had
three plots or less. In some communes, there were on average around two plots per
farm household, such as in Dan Tien 2.12 (decreased from 5.57 plots) and Chi Dao
2.43 (decreased from 5.11 plots). The highest average numbers of plots per household
were 4.81 and 4.79 (decreased from 7.97 and 7.0 plots) in Trung Dung and Hung An
communes respectively (Hung Yen People's Committee 2002).
In reports made to the central and local governments, the conclusion is that the policy
of plot exchange should be implemented where farmers realise there is a problem of
fragmentation and land relations are in order (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural
Development 2002). This means that plot exchange should not lead to new conflicts
related to land allocation. The most important principle is that farmers should
voluntarily exchange land to result in larger plot areas for each individual (Ministry of
Agriculture and Rural Development 2002). However, in many provinces the land re-
allocation process occurs without much input from farmers. Farmers are only
involved in the assessment of land quality in order to determine the exchange
coefficients
8. Farmers still believe that land is owned by the state (the people as a
whole), so they believe they do not have rights to be involved in the process and
discuss how land use planning should be in general.
                                                
8 In some communes in Hung Yen province, the coefficient is 1.9 between the lowest and highest
quality of land. This means that a farmer can be allocated one Sao (360 m
2) of land of class one (the
highest quality) or 1.9 Sao of land of class six.6
Reasons for Land Fragmentation
In the literature, researchers have preferred to classify causes of land fragmentation
into two broad categories: supply–side and demand–side (Bentley 1987; Blarel et al.
1992). The supply-side causes refer to an exogenous imposition on farmers of a
pattern of land areas, while the second reflects varying degrees of fragmentation
chosen by farmers (Blarel et al. 1992).
A supply-side explanation of land fragmentation the view is that it may happen
involuntarily as a result based on historical, geographical issues, population pressure
and patterns of inheritance (Bentley 1987). Historical issues may be more significant
where land is scarce. In most developing countries in Africa and Asia where labour is
cheap, crop production is mainly carried out by hand cultivation and animal traction.
This is suited to small-scale and self-sufficient production. In such cases,
fragmentation is a certain result. Where production volume is large, fragmentation
may become a barrier to modern mechanisation and lead to increases in inefficiency.
Fragmentation is also a result of geographical conditions where the terrain is hilly and
upland areas exist. In these areas, land fragmentation is common. Historical and
geographical problems of land fragmentation are hard to overcome and it may take a
long time to consolidate such land areas.
Land fragmentation can also be explained by pressure of population growth (Bentley
1987; Blarel et al. 1992). Farms in regions where population growth is high and
farmers have less off-farm opportunities, may be more fragmented. This explanation
is common in the north of Vietnam where the population density is high, especially in
the Red River Delta. In 1998, the population density was 1,319 persons per square
kilometre for the Red River Delta and 229 for the whole country. There were
2,647,000 farm households in the Red River Delta while the figure for the whole
country was 10,981,000 (General Statistical Office 2000 and 2001). As a result, the
average farm sizes were 2,538 and 7,358 m
2 for the Red River Delta and the whole
country respectively. Another cause of land fragmentation can be inheritance, where
farmers want to give their children land of similar quality. The above mentioned
explanations are observed in many developing countries, such as China (Nguyen et al.
1996), Ghana and Rwanda (Blarel et al. 1992).
In Vietnam, land fragmentation has mainly been caused by the land allocation
process. After the Resolution 10 and especially the Land Law and the Ordinance
64/CP of the Prime Minister had been introduced in 1993, agricultural land was
officially allocated to the farm household for stable and long-term use. How to
allocate land to farmers was a question not only for the central government but also
for local governments and between farmers. In order to satisfy the needs of farmers on
an equitable basis, agricultural land was allocated equally on a per capita or per
‘capita equivalent’ basis. This is why each household may have several plots in
different areas even though some plots are very small, sometimes only about 100 m
2.
The situation is similar to China where farmers signed contracts with local
government authorities to utilise land after the Chinese government had introduced
the Household Responsibility System in the early 1980s (Nguyen et al. 1996).
Another cause of land fragmentation is the failure of land markets to operate
effectively because of government regulations on land transactions (Bentley 1987;7
Blarel et al. 1992). If the land market is under control of the government,
fragmentation may also be a result.  In Vietnam, the market for the exchange of land
use rights is still complicated and not well developed. Farmers who want to use their
land as collateral for borrowing money from banks need the permission and seal of
authority from the local government. Other transactions such as ‘selling’ or ‘buying’
land use rights are completed only if they are recorded and certified by the local
government. In many cases this is not done (Kerkvliet 2000). In Can Tho, a farm
household reported that they bought three plots of land each in 1992, 1996 and 1998.
For recording these transfers in the Red-book (land use certificate) they paid VND
480,000 ($US 40 in 1998) per cong
9 for a parcel bought in 1992
10. This amount of
money is not small for farmers. This is one of the reasons, why in some provinces
farmers may not want to record their land transactions with the local government.
‘Demand-side’ causes of land fragmentation arise when farmers consider that land
fragmentation may have some benefits. In this case it is possible for the private
benefits of land fragmentation to exceed its private costs (Blarel et al. 1992; Hung and
MacAulay 2002). It is also possible that the transaction costs for reducing
fragmentation are sufficiently high for farmers not to undertake the set of land
transactions that would be needed to reduce the degree of fragmentation. Moreover,
farmers may realise some additional benefits from fragmentation. By cultivating plots
in different geographical areas, variation in output may be less because the risks
caused by drought, flood and diseases are spread. Another reason farmers want to
keep fragmented farms is that they may be able to use their seasonal labour more
effectively. Although labour is generally in surplus in Vietnam, especially in the Red
River Delta, in peak times (transplanting and harvesting periods) and during the
winter crop growing period, more labour is demanded, and even child labour is very
common in these periods. Therefore, farmers may reduce peak time labour periods by
diversifying crops in different plots.
The above demand-side explanations are based on the choice of farmers to choose to
retain certain levels of fragmentation that they perceive are beneficial to them. These
positive benefits are the impacts of fragmentation on risk-spreading, seasonal labour
spreading, and crop diversification. Another impact is that the land user can mortgage
or sell a portion of their land use rights easily and anytime. If land is not fragmented,
it is not easy to sell a half or a portion of their total land. They may also give land to
their children as an inheritance more easily when the children want to live separately.
However, land fragmentation causes many negative effects including higher costs,
prevention of mechanisation, increased negative externalities, loss of land due to
boundaries, and a greater potential for disputes between neighbouring farmers (Blarel
et al. 1992; Lan 2001; Hung and MacAulay 2002). Production costs may also be
higher due to higher costs for labour. For example, it takes more time to travel from
plot to plot and to operate an activity for a unit of land. Higher costs for labour also
are reflected in more time needed for irrigation, especially during a drought period. A
major source of higher production costs is the higher transport costs of inputs and
outputs. If land is fragmented, transportation distances will be higher and there is
                                                
9 Cong is a common unit of land in the Mekong Delta and equal to 1000 m
2.
10 The author was an interviewer for the second survey of the ACIAR project in the South of Vietnam
in July and August 2002 and noted this case.8
more fuel and labour needed.
Other problems caused by fragmentation may be higher negative externalities which
can happen when farmers cultivate different crops or varieties (Bentley 1987). This
leads to greater potential for disputes between neighbours. Land fragmentation also
causes an increased land loss due to plot boundaries or bunds and access routes
(because more plots have more boundaries so each plot can retain water and  be
distinguished from neighbouring plots).  This loss of land is directly related to the
number of plots. In addition, it is hard to apply new technologies in the case of small
and fragmented farms. This is likely to be a main disadvantage of land fragmentation
in Vietnam.
Although, there are the above mentioned disadvantages of land fragmentation,
farmers in many provinces especially in the north and north central regions of
Vietnam still keep their parcels of land indicating they may not want to exchange
small plots for larger ones. This means that farmers probably benefit from some
degree of land fragmentation, by reducing risks from flood, drought and diseases,
making more efficient use of seasonal labour, and enabling crop diversification.
Land Fragmentation in the North of Vietnam: Evidence from Survey Data
Measuring land fragmentation
There is an absence of a standard measurement of land fragmentation. This leads to
difficulties in determining when farm households are ‘too fragmented’ or ‘less
fragmented’. Bentley (1987) reports that most authors have used two simple
measurements of land fragmentation: the number of plots per farm and the average
farm size. However, the distance to plots is ignored in these measurements. Some
authors have considered that land fragmentation should be measured by six
parameters: farm size, the number of plots, plot size, plot shape, spatial distribution,
and the size distribution of the fields (King and Burton 1982; Bentley 1987). Bentley
(1987) also cites three other measures of land fragmentation. Simmon’s index of land
fragmentation is measured by the sum of the squares of the plot sizes, divided by the
square of the farm size or total plot areas. This index is likely to be similar to
Simpson’s diversification index. Januszewki’s index is given by the square root of the
farm size, divided by the sum of the square root of the plot areas. Igbozurike’s index
is the total distance travelled to reach all of the plots, multiplied by the average plot
size, divided by 100. There is also the possibility of using other diversification
indexes to measure fragmentation, because there is evidence that if farmers have more
plots their production may be more diversified. However, each measure has
advantages as well as disadvantages when it is used alone.
In this paper, two main measures of fragmentation are used: the number of plots per
farm household and Simpson’s diversification index. Blarel, Hazell et al. (1982) have
also used these two indicators to measure land fragmentation in Ghana and Rwanda.
Other measures such as farm size, plot sizes, and distances are also considered. The
number of plots per farm is simple and easy to understand for a public audience, but it
ignores other important factors such as plot and farm sizes and the distance to plots.9





2 ) where ai is the area of the ith plot, A is the
farm size and A = ∑ ai. This index has a value between zero and one.  A value of zero
means that the farm household has only one parcel or plot of land, which indicates
complete land consolidation, while a value close to one means the household has
numerous plots and the farm is ‘very fragmented’. A disadvantage of this index is that
it is sensitive to the number of plots as well as their sizes. Fragmentation will decrease
when the area of big plots increases or/and that of small plots decreases.
Fragmentation Evidence from Survey Data
Two provinces, Ha Tay and Yen Bai, in the North were chosen as research sites for
the ACIAR project
11. In each province, two districts, one where farm sizes were
smaller than average and the other where farm sizes were larger than average, were
chosen. This same procedure was followed in selecting two communes in each
district. In Ha Tay province located in the Red River Delta, Dai Dong and Thach Hoa
commune in Thach That district were selected for surveying, while in Dan Phuong
district the two communes were Song Phuong and Tho Xuan. In Yen Bai province
located in the midland area, the four communes were Dai Dong and Bao Ai in Yen
Binh district, and Mau Dong and Dong Cuong in Van Yen district. Data for two years
(2000 and 2001) were collected by using prepared questionnaires. Staff and fourth
year students at the Faculty of Economics and Rural Development, Hanoi Agricultural
University helped the research team members to conduct the survey.
Ha Tay province is characterised by low land and a small farm size while the Yen Bai
province is located in the upland region and has a larger farm size. Part of Ha Tay has
some upland area, therefore, the average farm size is likely to be larger than that of
other provinces in the Red River Delta. Land in Vietnam, especially in the North and
in the Red River Delta is scarce so farm size is small in comparison with that in other
developing countries. However, farm size also varies even in a province, or a district.
According to data from the first survey, average farm sizes including resettlement
land, agricultural land, ponds, and forestry land in Ha Tay and Yen Bai were 6,300.9
and 25,128.7 m
2 in 2000, respectively (Table 1). At the commune level, average farm
sizes in Dai Dong and Thach Hoa commune (both in Ha Tay) were 3,832 and 10,506
m
2, respectively. In Yen Bai, these figures were 11,972 m
2 in Bao Ai commune and
53,149 m
2 in Dai Dong commune (Tables 2 and 3). More than 93 percent of the
surveyed farms in Ha Tay had a farm size between 1,001 and 5,000 m
2, while this
figure for Yen Bai was only 38 percent. On the other hand, only 2.1 percent of the
surveyed farms in Ha Tay had farm size larger than the land limit (two hectares) while
in Yen Bai the figure was 37.4 percent, and even higher in some communes such as
Dai Dong (55 percent) (Figures 1 and 2). This has led to the conclusion that the higher
the average farm size in a commune, the larger the variation of farm size (Marsh and
MacAulay 2003).
Yen Bai province is located in an upland and mountainous area. This is why it has a
larger farm size than other provinces, especially than those in the Red River Delta.
                                                
11 The ACIAR project ADP 1/97/092 was entitled “Impacts of the alternative policy options on the
agricultural sector of Vietnam”10
However, annual crop land and rice fields were not significantly different in size in
comparison with those in the delta. The biggest difference was in the size of hill and
forestry land. Therefore, the average farm size in the region was larger. In 2000, the
average farm sizes for Dai Dong, Bao Ai, Mau Dong, and Dong Cuong commune
were in turn 53,149, 11,972, 23,603, 18,929 m
2 respectively (Table 3). The
distribution of households by farm size in four communes was also different, but most
of the households had farm sizes between 5,001 to 10,000 m
2 and larger than 20,000
m
2. For example, 80, 64, 79, and 80 percent of households had a farm size falling into
these two groups in Dai Dong, Bao Ai, Mau Dong, and Dong Cuong commune,
respectively (Figure 2).
Based on the survey data, farm size is closely related to plot size (Hung and
MacAulay 2002; Marsh and MacAulay 2002, 2003). When farm size is small, on
average, individual plot areas cannot be very large, especially in the case where land
is allocated to family members. In Ha Tay, the average farm size and plot size in Dai
Dong commune were in turn 3,831.9 and 453.0 m
2 respectively, while these figures
for Thach Hoa commune were 10,506.5 and 1,358.0 m
2 respectively (Table 2). The
same situation was also observed in Yen Bai province. The average farm size and plot
size in Dai Dong commune were 53,149.2 and 5,509.4 m
2 respectively, while in Bao
Ai these were in turn 11,972.3 and 1,688.4 m
2 respectively (Table 3). The same
situation is observed in the average sizes of smallest and largest plots in the four
communes (Table 2 and 3).
Households in the surveyed areas had an average of 7.09 plots or parcels of land, of
which the figures for Ha Tay and Yen Bai were in turn 6.48 and 7.73 plots,
respectively (Table 1). The average number of plots also varied from region to region
and commune to commune. Seventy six percent of farms in Ha Tay had three to eight
plots while this figure for Yen Bai was 56 percent. There were only 6.6 percent of
farms in Ha Tay that had more than 11 plots while this figure for Yen Bai was more
than 17 percent. If the degree of fragmentation is measured by the number of plots,
Yen Bai’s farms were “more fragmented” than those in Ha Tay while if the degree of
fragmentation is measured by Simpson’s index the conclusion is the reverse. This
means that Yen Bai’s farms were “less fragmented” when measured with Simpson’s
index. Farms in Yen Bai had, on average, a value for Simpson’s index of 0.53 while
this figure for Ha Tay was 0.75. More than 90 and 48 percent of farms in Ha Tay had
a value of the index higher than 0.6 and 0.8 respectively, while for Yen Bai it was 45
and 18 percent respectively. This means that in Yen Bai there were more larger plots
and/or smaller plots because this index is sensitive to the area of the largest or
smallest plots.
The degree of fragmentation measured by the above mentioned indicators also varied
from commune to commune (Tables 2 and 3). In Dai Dong commune (Yen Bai
province), 30 percent of households had more than 11 plots while this figure was only
five percent in Dong Cuong commune. Ten and 28 percent of farms in these two
communes had between three and five plots. In Ha Tay province, 20 percent of
households in Dai Dong commune had more than 11 plots but no households in Tho
Xuan and Song Phuong had this many plots. Twenty percent of farms in Dai Dong
had three to five plots while these figures for Tho Xuan and Song Phuong were 69
and 62 percent respectively (Figure 3 and 4). This means that even within a province
or region the level of fragmentation may be different and fragmentation can be11
dependent on natural geography.
The number of plots and farm size appear not to be significantly related (Hung and
MacAulay 2002). Figures 7, 8 and 9 show the relationships for the two provinces.
This means that land consolidation may occur without land accumulation through plot
exchanges. Figures 5 and 6 show the distribution of the number of plots by the area of
plots. The distribution was similar in the two provinces. Fifty four and 55 percent of
the total number of plots in Ha Tay and Yen Bai respectively had areas of less than
400 m
2, although the average areas of a plot in the two provinces were different (831
and 3,233 m
2 in Ha Tay and Yen Bai respectively) (Table 1). However, the data by
commune shows that the distributions are different. For example, 70 percent of plots
in Dai Dong commune (Ha Tay province) had areas of less than 400 m
2 while this
figure for Song Phuong commune was only 36 percent. In Yen Bai province, 26
percent of plots in Dai Dong commune had areas larger than 1000 m
2 while this figure
for Mau Dong commune was 15 percent only.
Some authors assert that fragmentation seems to be a serious problem for agricultural
production in Vietnam (Lan 2001; Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
2002). In order to investigate this, the correlation between fragmentation and costs
and returns (yields and revenues) was calculated and tested on five main crops (first
and second rice crops, maize, soybeans, and vegetables and flowers) and 6 crop
rotations (Tables 4 and 5).  The fragmentation variable (number of plots per
household) was not significantly correlated with yields from the five crops or the
revenue from the crop rotations, with the exception of two rotations of rice-rice and
rice-rice-maize. Thus, without taking into account other interacting variables,
fragmentation appears to have little or no effect on land productivity. In general, there
were also no significant correlations between fragmentation levels and total expenses
or the use of nitrogen fertiliser. However, it was found that there were significant
correlations with labour use (both family and hired labour). The rice-rice rotation
appears to be significantly correlated with labour, and also two other rotations of rice-
rice-soybeans and vegetables and flowers. Correlations were particularly strong with
hired labour, with correlation coefficients greater than 0.78 (Table 4 and 5).
Therefore, fragmentation is unlikely to have significant effects on yields, revenues
and the costs related to crops but may be significant in relation to labour use. In the
Red River Delta, agricultural labour is still in surplus, however, in the future when the
opportunity for off-farm jobs is greater land fragmentation may become a more
serious problem.
The effects of land fragmentation will also be affected by the distance from the
farmer’s home to plots. In Ha Tay province, the distance to parcels is on average
about 700 metres (Table 1). Fifty percent of plots had a distance less than 500 metres
(except for farmers in Song Phuong). For 25 and 17 percent of plots in Dan Phuong
and Thach That respectively, farmers must travel more than one kilometre to reach
their parcels (Figure 10). In Yen Bai province, an average distance from home to
annual land plots varied from commune to commune; for example, it was on average
411 metres in Mau Dong and 729 metres in Dong Cuong (Table 2). In Yen Bai, the
number of plots located far from the farmer’s home was less than that in Ha Tay.
There were only five and six percent of the total plots in which farmers must travel
more than one kilometre to reach their plots in Yen Binh and Van Yen district,
respectively (Figure 11). This implies that the annual crop land in Yen Bai is often12
located in a valley floor or low land close to the farmer’s home and village. Distance
to plots may not be a problem specific to fragmented farms. In the case of
consolidation or accumulation of land, that is, a farmer may still travel a similar
distance.
Comparative Static Farm Model
In this paper, a household model related to the crop production of the household is
used. It is assumed that a labour market exists in which households can hire labour
and be employed. There is also assumed to be a market for land use rights, that is,
farmers can rent out their land or rent in land (Marsh and MacAulay 2004). Credit is
constrained. A household must pay some transaction costs for their entry into the land
transaction and credit markets. Land fragmentation (the number of plots) is given and
assumed to affect production costs. Let household i be endowed with a fixed amount
of labour (Li), capital (Ki), landAi, a number of plots ( i N ), and a given level of
agricultural ability (αi)
12.
Assume that household i has j plots, Qji is output obtained in plot j (j=1, N) of
household i (i = 1, M). The production function for plot j of household i, therefore, is
(1) Qij =F ij(lfij, lhij, xij, aij)
Where: lfij = family labour used in plot j, household i, and ∑j lfij = Lfi
lhij = hired in labour, and ∑j lhij = Lhi
xij = a vector of inputs used in plot j of household i, ∑j xij = Xi
aij = area of plot j of household i, and ∑j aij = Ai (Ai is operating areas
of  household i)
A householder will be assumed to maximise his/her income from three sources, being
agricultural production outputs from all plots, off-farm work and renting out (or in)
land. This for household i:
(2) Max (π) = ∑j Pi αi Fij(lfij, lhij, xij, aij)+  w 1 Loi  - w2 Lhi
+ G
out (Ai – Ai)(r2 – T2) - G
in (Ai – Ai)(r2 + T2)
- ∑j (Pxi + T3) xij
- G
bor [∑j (Pxi + T3) xij + G
in (Ai – Ai)(r2 + T2) + w2 Lhi  - Ki](r1 + T1)
(i = 1, M = number of households; j = 1, N = number of plots)
For notation simplicity, i is ignored.
Where: P = price of output
α = agricultural production ability of household
L = Lf + Lo = ∑j lfj + Lo = total household labour
Lf = ∑j lfj = total working on farm
Lo = L - Lf = L - ∑j lfj = total working off-farm
                                                
12 This variable was introduced by Deininger and Jin (2003)13
Lh = ∑j lhj = total hired in labour
w1 and w2 are wages of off-farm jobs and hired in labour respectively
K =  ∑j (Px + T3) xj + G
in (Ai – Ai)(r2 + T2) + w2 Lhi
= (Px + T3) X + G
in (Ai – Ai)(r2 + T2) + w2 Lhi
= total operating capital
G
bor = 1, if the household borrows money, and 0 otherwise
G
out = 1, if the household rents out land, and 0 otherwise
G
in = 1, if the household rents in land, and 0 otherwise
If G
out = 1, then G
in = 0 and G




in = 0, if the household has no land transaction (no renting in or
out)
r1 and T1 are interest rate and credit transaction costs respectively
r2 and T2 are rental rate and transaction costs respectively
T3 is the transaction cost of fragmentation. It is assumed that an
increase in the number of plots may increase some costs of transportation and other
costs so that it increases the direct costs.





= Fz > 0 (where z = lf, lh, x, and a (for simplicity, hereafter lf and lh




2 = Fzz < 0; and Fzz* > 0 (where z
* = f, h, x, a and z ≠ z
*)
This means that positive marginal products and diminishing marginal returns are





*. The first-order conditions of the problem (2) are:
(3) ∑j P α 
∂Fj
∂lfj
– N w1 = 0
(4)  ∑j P α 
∂Fj
∂lhj
– N w2 = 0
(4’)  ∑j P α 
∂Fj
∂lhj
– N w2  – N w2 (r1 + T1) = 0
for households who borrow money
(5)  ∑j P α 
∂Fj
∂xj
–  N (Px + T3)=  0
(5’)  ∑j P α 
∂Fj
∂xj
– N (Px + T3) – N(Px+ T3) (r1 + T1) = 0
for households who borrow money







– N (r2 – T2) = 0
for households who rent out14







– N (r2 + T2) = 0
for households who rent in







– N (r2 + T2) – N (r2 + T2) (r1 + T1) = 0
for households who rent in and borrow money
Thus, for households who do not rent out or in land (no land transactions):
(7) N (r2 – T2) <  ∑j P α  
∂Fj
∂aj
  <  N (r2 + T2)
or N  (r2 – T2) <  ∑j P α  
∂Fj
∂aj
  <  N (r2 + T2) (1 + r1 + T1)
for households who borrow money
The first order conditions allow the derivation a set of comparative static conclusions
(see the Appendix for a more detailed derivation).
Equation (3) implies that the total value of the marginal product of family labour from
all plots of a household should be equal to the off-farm wage multiplied by the
number of plots. If the total returns to family labour are maintained at some level, an
increase in the off-farm wage will reduce the number of plots. Thus, the opportunity
for off-farm labour is one of the key factors that will encourage land consolidation.
Equation (A7) implies that farm land operated by the household increases with
increasing agricultural production ability of the household, α. The amount of land
rented in also increases with increasing agricultural production ability of the
household and decreases for households with a higher land endowment, Ai
(Equations A12 and 13). Therefore, rental markets will transfer to “poor but efficient”
crop producers (Deininger and Jin 2003). However, farm land operated by the
household and the amount of land rented in increases with increasing capital
endowment,  Ki (Equation A20).  Thus, “rich” farmers may be more active in the
rental market than “poor” farmers. These two results suggest that both farmers with
relatively small and large areas of farm land could be expected to be active in the
rental market (as observed by Marsh and MacAulay, 2004). Currently, most of the
rural population is still involved in agricultural production because the opportunity for
off-farm jobs is limited. However, in the future when the opportunity for off-farm
employment is greater, land may transfer to small-sized farms with high agricultural
ability.
Equation (A14) implies that small-sized farms are likely to be “more fragmented”
than large sized farms. Thus, land fragmentation will be present for small, subsistence
oriented production (Bentley 1987). Land fragmentation as measured by the number
of plots decreases with increasing agricultural production ability of the household
(Equation A16). Therefore, a system of extension and training is needed to facilitate
land consolidation.
Equations (A22 and A24) imply that the amount of land rented in and out decreases
with increasing transaction costs in land rental market, T2. As a result, this leads to a
reduction in the number of households who participate in the rental markets.15
Therefore, a reduction in the transaction costs or a simpler procedure for land
registration (the land transaction record) may result in a stronger market for land use
rights.
The number of plots, N, increases as transaction costs associated with the credit
market, T1, the market for land use rights, T2, and land fragmentation, T3, increase
(Equations A27, A28, and A29). If the procedure for loans and/or land transactions is
simpler, the number of plots or land fragmentation may decrease. Reforms in the
administration sector will reduce transaction costs and, therefore, may encourage land
consolidation. Additionally, a reduction in transaction costs will increase the profit
and income of the farm household. This leads to the conclusion that administration
reforms are needed, and will make all farmers better off.
A reasonable assumption is that households with a high agricultural production ability
who specialise in agricultural production will continue to rent in land and their off-
farm opportunities remain the same as before. Those households with low agricultural
ability who join the off-farm labour force will take advantage of an increase in off-
farm wages, w1. The amount of land rented out increases as off-farm wages increase
(Equation A31). Thus, an increase in the wage rate for off-farm employment may
increase land transacted in the rental market. As a result, this may lead to a decrease
in the equilibrium rental rate which will make everybody better off (Deininger and Jin
2003). Therefore, an increase in the opportunity for off-farm jobs may be a key policy
to encourage not only an active market for land use rights but also agricultural
production and an increase in farmers’ income.
An Empirical Model and Results
If the production function in (2) follows constant returns to size, then the output
function is equivalent to the yield function. When returns to size are unclear, instead
of the output function, the yield function can be estimated with the adjusted land
areas.
The yield function can be written as:
(8) Y = f(Lf, Lh, x). h(A)
h(A) = µ0 A
µ1 e
µ2A
Where yield, Y is assumed to be separable into functions f and h. Function f is the
yield per unit of land area while function h incorporates economies of farm size
(MacAulay and Hertzler 2000). If there are no economies or diseconomies of size, µ0
and µ1 will be one, µ2 will be zero and function h will equal the area A
13. Function f
can be designed with the variables in different forms. MacAulay and Hertzler (2000)
suggested that the variable inputs can be designed in the transcendental form while
the labour input may be in the Cobb-Douglas form. In Vietnam, agricultural labour is
still in surplus, therefore, in the empirical model, hired labour is designed in a Cobb-
Douglas form while the family labour input is a transcendental form. Fertiliser inputs
are expressed in the translog form while other variable inputs (seed application and
                                                
13 In cases where the household cultivates one crop, otherwise A may be a plot area.16
money expenses) and land area (farm size) are also assumed to be in the
transcendental form. Land fragmentation, measured by the number of plots, is
included in the model with a Cobb-Douglas form. Other discrete variables (number of
crops and education level) are in a semi-log form. The intercept can be separated into
two elements, of which one reflects household characteristics or the effect of each
household, which is considered as an agricultural production ability of the household.
Another element represents other factors such as access to infrastructure and markets,
soil quality, and climate (Deininger and Jin 2003).
In logarithmic linear form the function becomes:
(9) Ln (Y)     =  (α1 + α2) + β1 Ln(X1) + β2 Ln(X2) + β3 Ln(X3)
+ β4 Ln(X1)Ln(X2) +  β5 Ln(X1)Ln(X3) +  β6 Ln(X2)Ln(X3)
+ β7 Ln (X4) + β8 X4 + β9 Ln (X5) + β10 X5 + β11 Ln (X6)
+ β12 X6 + β13 Ln (X7) + β14 Ln (X8) + β15 X8 + β16 Ln (X9)
+ β17 X10 + β18 X11 + δ1 D1 + δ2 D2 + U
Where:  Y  = equivalent rice yield of a crop rotation (kg/ha/year)
X1 = Nitrogen input (kg/ha/year)
X2 = Phosphorus input (kg/ha/year)
X3 = Potassium input (kg/ha/year)
X4 = expenditure of seed application (VND ‘000/ha/year)
X5 = Other money expenses (VND ‘000/ha/year)
X6 = Family labour input (person days/ha/year)
X7 = Hired labour input (person days/ha/year)
X8 = Farm area (sao = 360 m
2)
X9 = Number of plots per farm household (no.)
X10 = Number of crops in a rotation (X10 = 1 – 3)
X11 = Level of education of household head (X11 = 0 – 5 that are
equivalent to illiterate, primary, secondary, high school, college, and university level)
D1 = Province dummy variable; D1 = 1, if household located in Ha Tay
    D1 = 0, otherwise
D2 = Dummy variable for land use change;
D2 = 1, if household change to cultivate flowers or high value
cash crops
D2 = 0, otherwise
U = disturbances; Ln = natural logarithm
Let β0 = (α1 + α2)
α1 = agricultural ability
α2 = village-level characteristics
βi (i = 0 – 18), δ1 and δ2 are coefficients to be estimated
Multiple crops are often produced on a single plot (one rotation). In order to aggregate
yields of different crops, an average of price ratios between rice and other crops was
used so that the dependent variable was a price weighted average representing the
equivalent rice yield of a rotation per hectare.
In the model, it was expected that fragmentation, represented by the number of plots,
would have a negative sign while other money expenses, number of crops in a17
rotation, education level, and dummy for land use change would have positive signs.
Results are given in Table 6.
Table 6.  Annual crop yield function in Ha Tay and Yen Bai Province, 2000
Estimates Coefficients T – value Significance
level
β0    Intercept 7.9490 31.539 ***
β1   Nitrogen input 0.0462 3.162 ***
β2   Phosphorus input -0.0180 -1.033 ns
β3   Potassium input -0.0213 -1.214 ns
β4   Nitrogen * Phosphorus 0.0028 0.998 ns
β5   Nitrogen * Potassium 0.0066 2.238 **
β6     Phosphorus * Potassium -0.0007 -0.590 ns
β7   Seed application 0.0267 2.130 **
β8   Seed application (exp) 0.0001 1.016 ns
β9   Other money expenses 0.0564 3.355 ***
β10  Other money expenses (exp) 0.0000 3.091 ***
β11  Family labour -0.0492 -2.154 **
β12  Family labour (exp) 0.0005 6.305 ***
β13  Hired labour 0.0307 1.845 *
β14  Farm area 0.0634 1.376 ns
β15  Farm areas (exp) -0.0004 -0.933 ns
β16  Number of plots -0.0823 -1.339 ns
β17  Number of crops (exp) 0.2672 4.745 ***
β18  Education level (exp) 0.0527 1.757 *
δ1     Province dummy (Ha Tay = 1) 0.0518 0.607 ns
δ2    Dummy for land use change 0.2530 1.732 *
     Sample size, n 303
     Log likelihood function -162.92
     F value 24.14 ***
     R
2 0.63
     Adjusted R
2 0.60
Note:  ***, **, and * are significant at 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively.
Ns is none-significant
The production function in (9) was estimated using frontier regression methods. The
software used was FRONTIER 4.1 (Coelli 1994). From the results it would seem that
a reasonable response function has been estimated (trans-log form in fertiliser
variables, transcendental form in other variable inputs, except hired labour and also
land area with appropriate signs on all the variables except the non-significant
phosphorus and potassium. The R
2 values were reasonable and significantly different
from zero at one percent (F value = 24.14). The coefficient β1 and the trans-log term
β5 were significantly different from zero.  This meant that an increase in nitrogen used
would increase the yield. Both coefficients β9 and β10 were positive and significantly
different from zero at one percent. This implies that the other money expenses18
(excluding expenses for seed and application of the three fertilisers) seem to be a
factor that increases the yield with increasing marginal product. Coefficients on the
farm area variable were not significant supporting the idea that there were no
economies of size for the range of areas considered.
For the estimated model, the coefficient β16 (number of plots) was not statistically
different from zero. This meant that, statistically, the number of plots has not been
shown to have an effect on productivity as reflected in the equivalent rice yield.
Although this result suggests that there is no effect of plot number on farm
performance, this may not imply that fragmentation has no effects at all on crop
productivity because it was earlier shown to be correlated with the revenue from two
rotations (rice-rice and rice-rice-maize) and also with labour use. Using a higher
significance level (of about 17 percent) the equivalent yield was negatively related to
the number of plots (fragmentation level). This would seem to imply that the effects
of fragmentation on productivity may be weak, and affect factors such as labour use
more significantly than the output. Secondly, it may also imply that farmers have
adjusted to the use of fragmented holdings. They may choose crop patterns suitable
for fragmented land given the technology and other conditions. Another reason could
be that the average plot size is so small (749 m
2) and the current technology chosen by
most of the farmers is similar and cannot be adjusted within the plot numbers being
considered. The results may also imply that the private costs for changing the land
fragmentation situation may be higher than the private benefits resulting from such
changes.
The labour variables, including both family and hired labour, were statistically
significant. This implies that they were a major factor which affected crop yields and
revenue of a rotation. As a result, increases in hired labour of 10 percent were found
to increase crop yield by 0.31 percent. The coefficient β11 (family labour) was
negative when in its transcendental term, β12 was positive and both of them were
statistically different from zero. However, within the range being considered the
elasticity of crop yield with respect to family labour was positive
14.  An increase in
family labour of 10 percent was found to increase the yield, on average, by 2.24
percent. Other research on rice productivity in the Red River Delta has found that
family labour used in rice production may be overused
15. In this paper, the model is
for a rotation that includes winter crops and ‘cash’ crops such as vegetables, flowers
and annual industrial crops (soybeans and peanuts). These crops may be more labour
intensive, so that an increase in labour would increase crop yield and revenue.
The coefficient β17 (number of crops) was statistically significant at one percent. This
was the number of crops cultivated in a rotation, which is dependent on soil quality
and good irrigation conditions. Therefore, areas with good soil will increase the
equivalent yield and revenue.
The coefficient β18 was also statistically significant and positive. This implies that in
                                                
14 The elasticity is equal to (-0.0492 + 0.0005 X6) where X6 is family labour and it’s mean is 547 man-
days per hectare giving a value of 0.224.
15 This work was on pesticide use and rice productivity in Hanoi province (Hung 1998) and by Cuong
(2002).19
the surveyed areas the equivalent crop yield increases as the level of education of the
household head increases. However, the yield increases by only 0.0527 per cent as the
household head moved from the first to the second level of education (for example,
from primary to secondary school). The reason could be that all members of the
household, and not only the household head, contribute to crop production.
The coefficient δ1 (provincial dummy) was not significantly different from zero. This
suggests that the equivalent yield from annual crops per unit of land in the two
provinces is not different from each other. In general, the gross margins of annual
crop rotations in the Red River Delta have been found to be higher than in the upland
and mountainous areas. However, based on the use of a stochastic production frontier
it was predicted that the technical efficiency levels for rice production would be 72
percent in Yen Bai while in Ha Tay it was only 66 percent for the year 1999 (Kompas
2002). This means that in the mountainous areas farmers may cultivate just as
intensively as those in the low land areas.
The dummy for land use change was also significant. Those households who have
cultivated flowers rather than rice or changed their land use purposes (from annual
crop land to growing fruit trees or fish farming) were classified into this group. This
suggests that if the government allows farmers to cultivate perennial crops (fruit trees)
or ‘cash’ crops (high value crops) instead of traditional annual crops (rice and maize),
the equivalent yield will increase.
The Relationship of Land Fragmentation to Output Risk Spreading and Crop
Diversity
Risk reduction is one of the benefits of land fragmentation. Risk reduction can be a
reduction in the variance of crop output obtained from cultivating several plots. In this
section, a model of Blarel et al. (1992) which measures the effect of land
fragmentation on the variance of output is used.
It is assumed that the yield for farmer i on plot j is separated into three parts, the
village average yield and its random effect (yo + µ), household effect (hi + ηi), and
plot effect (kij + ϕij). In mathematical form, it can be written:
(10) Qij/aij = (yo + µ) + (hi + ηi) + (kij + ϕij)
Where: Qij is the output of the jth plot of household i; aij is the area of plot j of
household i; yo is the village average yield for all plots and households; µ is a random
village-level effect; hi is a fixed household effect; ηi is a random household effect; kij
is a fixed effect of plots; and ϕij is a random plot effect.
The derivation of the variance yields (see Appendix C for more detailed derivation):
(11) Var [(∑jQij)/Ai] = Var(µ) + Var(ηi)  + (1 – S) Var(ϕij)
Where Ai is the farm area (farm size) of household i; Var is the variance; S is the20




), and others are denoted as
before.
The variance of the household farm output decreases linearly as land fragmentation
measured by Simpson’s index, S, increases. This means that fragmented farms may
reduce their output risk.
The equation (11) can be estimated by using simple regression.
(12) Y = α0 + α1 X + U
where Y =  Var [(∑jQij)/Ai]
α0 = Var(µ)
α1 = Var(ϕij)
U =  Var(ηi)
X = (1 – S)
In order to calculate the variance of output, multiple observations of a household are
needed and time series data is best for estimation (Blarel et al. 1992). In this paper,
the authors used cross-sectional data, because each household may cultivate a
different rotation in different plots. Thus, a household may have more than one
observation allowing short-term variance to be estimated. Therefore, the variance of
the equivalent yield in each plot was used in this research
16. However, data on output
for some households was available for a single rotation only. Thus, the number of
observations has been reduced compared to the full survey. Results are given in Table
7.
The model was estimated using ordinary least squares and was not statistically
significant. The relationship between reduction of output risk and the land
fragmentation index in the research sites was found to be unclear. This meant that
households in the research sites may not have benefited from output risk spreading
due to land fragmentation. The reason could also be that the farm area was small and
farm households intensively farm the same crops on all plots. However, to reach a
clear conclusion time series data are needed to estimate equation (12). This is an area
for further research.
Farmers can benefit from numerous parcels of land because their crop patterns can be
more diversified and flexible because of differing land types and land qualities on
different plots. In order to test the relationship between fragmentation and the level of
crop diversity, a simple model was used. In linear form, the model proposed can be
written as:
(13) Y = β0 + β1 X1 + β2 X2 + β3 X3 + β4 X4 + β5 X5 + U
where: Y is the number of land uses (no.)
                                                








) where x is the equivalent rice
yield of a rotation of the household and n is the number of rotations of the household.21
X1 is Simpson’s index of land fragmentation of a household
X2 is percentage of cultivated land (%)
X3 is the average crop pattern of the household (average number of crops/year)
X4 is the level of education of household head (X4 = 0 – 5 that are equivalent
to illiterate, primary, secondary, high school, college, and university level)
X5 is the age of household head (years)
U is disturbances
βi (i = 0-5) are coefficients to be estimated
Crop diversity is defined as the number of land uses. There were complicated crop
patterns in the research sites such as multiple crops cultivated in a rotation, mixed
orchards, perennial crops. In this paper, the same crops in different seasons were
counted as different land uses, for example, spring and summer rice count as two land
uses; mixed orchards and forests were counted as one land use; and fish farming was
also counted as a land use. The dependent variable is the number of land uses which
varied from two to ten. Therefore, the truncated estimation was used. The average
crop pattern was the average number of crops cultivated in a plot of a household per
year. The level of education was defined as in Table 6. Results are given in Table 8.
From the results it would seem that the model was reasonable with the F value of 7.87
which was significantly different from zero at one percent. All coefficients were
statistically significant with the exception of two variables, the education level and
age of the household head.  The number of land uses increased as the crop pattern
increased and decreased as the percentage of annual crop land increased. This means
that households having a higher percentage of different land types such as perennial
and pond land will have greater production diversity. Land fragmentation measured
by Simpson’s index was positively related to crop diversity. In the context of a
subsistence oriented agricultural production, this may lead to security of not only food
but also farmers’ incomes. This is why in some provinces farmers may want to keep
existing levels of land fragmentation. Therefore, the trade off between the level of
crop diversity or land fragmentation and commercial production should be questioned
and is a needed area for future studies.
Conclusion
From a theoretical point of view, fragmentation of plots on farms has both benefits
and costs.  These have been identified as shown in Table 9.  The relative values of
these benefits and costs, which will be different for different farm households, will
affect the economics of land fragmentation for individual households and for the
public more generally.
In this paper, a number of different methods have been used to investigate the
economics of land fragmentation, including both theoretical comparative statics
analysis and empirical analysis of survey data from farm households in the North of
Vietnam.22
Table 9.  Costs and Benefits Associated with Land Fragmentation
Benefits of many plots Costs of many plots
Private benefits Public benefits Private costs Public cost
+ Risk spreading
   - Flooding
   - Diseases and pests
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Using survey data from 303 plot-based observations from 179 farm households in the
North of Vietnam it was found that the number of plots per household did not appear
to be correlated with the rice equivalent crop yields or revenue earned from various
types of rotations.  However, labour use did appear to be related to the number of
plots.  Other factors such as fertiliser and other costs did not appear to be related. Data
analysis also showed that fragmentation was not a significant determinant of output
risk spreading but it did appear to be a significant factor for crop diversity.
As Vietnam appears to have surplus agricultural labour, at least for much of the
production year, the real benefits to farm households from land consolidation may not
be apparent until the real opportunity cost of farm labour begins to rise.  This
opportunity cost will clearly be affected by a number of factors such as the
availability of employment opportunities for the farm family members and the wage
rate associated with these opportunities, the level of education and age of the rural
workforce, the time of year and season. The transactions costs involved in job search
will be an issue as will the reliability of the employment. Therefore, creation of new
off-farm jobs and movement of the agricultural labour force to other sectors of the
economy will be a key policy for agricultural and rural development in the future.
Administration reforms are being considered in Vietnam. This may lead to a reduction
in the transaction costs associated with the credit market, the market for land use
rights and land fragmentation. Comparative statics analysis suggests that if this were
the case then land consolidation would be encouraged and the market for land use23
rights would also likely to be more active. Therefore, reforms in the administration
sector are needed not only for the whole of society, but also for agricultural and rural
development that will make all farmers better off.
In the future, agricultural land may be concentrated in the hands of households who
have a high agricultural ability. Comparative statics analysis also shows that land
fragmentation is likely to decrease with increasing agricultural production ability.
Therefore, expansion and improvement of the extension and training systems in rural
areas will be very important and needed to facilitate land consolidation.
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Appendix A
Table 1. Fragmentation in Ha Tay and Yen Bai province (percentage of
households)
Provinces Yen Bai Ha Tay Total
Number of households
* 88 91 179
Simpson's Index
0-0.2 15.9 2.2 8.9
0.2-0.4 19.3 1.1 10.1
0.4-0.6 19.3 6.6 12.9
0.6-0.8 27.3 41.8 34.6
0.8-1.0 18.2 48.3 33.5
Mean
** 0.53 0.75 0.64
Median
** 0.56 0.80 0.74
Number of plots
<= 2 5.7 1.1 3.3
3 – 5 26.1 45.0 35.8
6 – 8 29.5 30.8 30.2
9 – 11 21.6 16.5 19.0
> 11 17.1 6.6 11.7
Mean





Mean 25,128.7 6,300.9 15,557.0
Median 11,919.0 4,284.0 5,104.0
Areas of plot (m
2)
Average areas of a plot 3,233 831 2,126
Average areas of smallest plots 2,001 246 224
Average areas of largest plots 18,168 2,710 10,309
Distance (m)
0-300 29.5 19.8 24.6
300-700 48.9 39.5 44.1
700-1000 15.9 20.9 18.4
> 1000 5.7 19.8 12.9
Mean (m)
 ** 496.0 676.6 587.8
Median
** 440.0 560.0 500.0
Note:  * Households which had no data on land and annual crop production were deleted; therefore,
the number of observations may be different from previous reports.
** Expressed in relevant units, not percentages.
Source: Household survey data 2000: ACIAR Project ADP 1/97/092.27
Table 2. Land fragmentation in Ha Tay province











Mean 3,831.9 10,506.5 6,920.9 4,982.1
Max 6,612.0 42,128.0 20,000.0 14,970.0
Min 2,052.0 930.0 1,440.0 1,494.4
Number of plots
Mean 8.46 7.74 5.41 4.65
Max 14 12 11 9
Min 3 3 1 3
Simpson’s index
Mean 0.84 0.69 0.74 0.75
Max 0.91 0.86 0.89 0.86
Min 0.51 0.10 0.00 0.55
Average areas of a plot (m
2) 453.0 1,358.0 1,279.5 1,070.5
Average areas of the smallest plot 131.3 206.2 348.9 298.3
Average areas of the largest plot 1,035.0 5,747.2 2,717.3 2,032.0
Average distances to a plot (m) 652.8 582.2 682.4 794.7
Average distances of nearest plots 469.6 423.4 387.7 253.1
Average distances of furthest plots 1,166.7 1,513.2 931.8 1,551.9
Table 3. Land fragmentation in Yen Bai province











Mean 53,149.2 11,972.3 23,603.4 18,929.7
Max 254,898.0 31,700.0 175,946.0 145,040.0
Min 1,676.0 1,320.0 1,464.0 1,515.0
Number of plots
Mean 9.65 7.09 7.96 6.71
Max 16 14 14 16
Min 5 2 3 2
Simpson’s index
Mean 0.41 0.59 0.53 0.54
Max 0.85 0.87 0.89 0.88
Min 0.08 0.24 0.09 0.06
Average areas of a plot (m
2) 5,509.4 1,688.4 2,965.2 2,821.8
Average areas of the smallest plot 130.7 251.8 152.6 253.6
Average areas of the largest plot 38,910.0 7,028.7 16,756.1 15,157.7
Average distances to a plot (m) 592.4 397.2 440.3 611.2
Average distances of nearest plots 292.9 337.3 292.4 341.7
Average distances of furthest plots 1,711.8 886.4 1,244.0 1,658.328
Table 4. Correlation coefficients between fragmentation and yields and costs









First Rice (n=233) 0.0703 0.1089
* 0.1901
*** -0.030 -0.0295
Second Rice (n=231) 0.0648 0.2032
*** 0.1712
** -0.0567 -0.0679
Maize (n=102) 0.0246 -0.1549
* -0.0660 -0.0064 -0.0557
Soybean (n=44) 0.0025 0.0695 - -0.1886 0.2758
*
Vegetables & Flowers 0.2147
a 0.1339 0.9672
*** 0.1891 -0.0640
Note: ***, **, and * are significantly different from zero at 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively.





, where r is the correlation coefficient, n is sample size).
a. Revenue
Table 5. Correlation coefficients between fragmentation and revenues and costs














** -0.0962 0.1408 0.2449
* 0.0794
Rice-Rice-Soybean (n=30) 0.0055 -0.0429 0.7768
*** -0.1225 -0.0300
Rice-Rice-Vegetables (n=13) 0.3072 0.6275
*** - 0.0114 0.1496
Vegetables & Flowers (n=13) 0.2894 0.0586 0.9672
*** 0.4878
* -0.0257
2 or 3 maizes (n=27) -0.2299 -0.2228 0.1027 -0.1890 -0.1429
Note: ***, **, and * are significantly different from zero at 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively.29
Table 7. Variance of output function
Estimates Coefficients T – value Significance level
α0    Intercept 370696100 1.451 ns
α1   Fragmentation (1 – S) -92028940 -0.125 ns
     Sample size, n 98
     F value 0.02 ns
     R
2 0.01
     Adjusted R
2 -0.01
Note: ns is non-significant.
Table 8. Crop diversity function
Estimates Coefficients T – value Significance level
β0    Intercept 2.241 2.41 **
β1    Simpson’s index 1.883 2.99 ***
β2    Cultivated land -0.023 -5.37 ***
β3    Crop pattern 0.851 3.29 ***
β4    Education level of household head 0.106 0.76 ns
β5    Age of household head 0.011 0.93 ns
     Sample size, n 179
     Log likelihood function -330.3
     F value 7.87 ***
     R
2 0.19
     Adjusted R
2 0.16
Note:  *** and ** are significantly different from zero at 1 and 5 percent, respectively.
ns is non-significant.30
Figure 1. Distribution of farm sizes in Ha Tay province
Figure 2. Distribution of farm sizes in Yen Bai province




























































































































Figure 4. Distribution of households by plot numbers in Yen Bai province
Figure 5. Distribution of plot numbers in Ha Tay province
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Figure 7. Distribution of the number of plots by farm size in Ha Tay
Figure 8. Distribution of the number of plots by farm size in Yen Bai
Figure 9. Distribution of the number of plots by farm size in Yen Bai


































































































Appendix B: Derivation of comparative statics
In this appendix the detailed comparative static analysis of the model in equation (2) is given.
Case 1: farm land operated by the household is strictly increasing in agricultural production
ability of the household, α. The amount of land rented in is also increasing in production
ability, α of the household and decreasing for households with a higher land endowment, Ai.
Therefore, rental markets may transfer to “small but efficient” crop producers.
Total differentiation of both sides of (3), (4), (5), (5’) and (6) or (6’’), with respect toα,
yields:
(A1) ∑j P  
∂F
∂lf
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(A2) ∑j P  
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(A4) ∑j P  
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 is noted as Fz only (where z = lf, lh, x, and a (and hereafter lf and lh











 as Fzz* (where z
* = f, h,
x, a and z ≠ z
*).
In matrix form, expressions (A1-A4) can be written as:
Fff Ffh Ffx Ffa ∑ 
∂lf
∂α α
∑ − f F





Ffx Fhx Fxx Fxa ∑ 
∂x
∂α α
∑ − x F
Ffa Fha Fxa Faa ∑ 
∂a
∂α α




 by Cramer’s rule, yields35
 Fff Ffh Ffx
α






∑ − x F
Ffa Fha Fxa
α




   =   
______________________________________________________
| H4 |
where H4 = Hessian Matrix
For a maximisation problem, | H4 | must be positive, thus, the sign of ∑
∂a
∂α
 depends on the
sign of the numerator of (A5).
The numerator =
(A6)   (-1)
1+4
α












∑ − a F
|C44| > 0, because
Ffh  Fhh Fhx
|C14| = Ffx Fhx Fxx > 0
Ffa Fha Fxa
And this same procedure yields |C24| < 0, |C34| > 0, and |C44| < 0
So,









  > 0
Expression (A7) implies that the higher the ability in agricultural production of the household
the higher the farm area operated by the household. Land is likely to be concentrated in the
households with the higher ability.
If households rent out land, the amount of land rented out, Aout is equal to  the endowed land
of the household, A substraction to the operated farm area, A.
(A8) Aout = A - A 











Expression (A9) implies that a household that rents out will rent out less land as their
productive ability increases.
For the households who rent in land, the amount of rented in land, Ain is equal to
(A10) Ain =A – A








Equation (A11) implies that the amount of rented in land is strictly increasing in the
agricultural production ability of the household and households who rent in land will rent
more land as their production ability improves.




 =  - 1 <  0
Equation (A12) implies that for those farm households who rent in land, the amount of land
rented in is strictly decreasing in their land endowment.
Case 2: farm land operated by the household is strictly decreasing in the number of plots. This
means that small sized farms are likely to be ‘more fragmented’ than large sized farms.
Therefore, land fragmentation is likely to be present for small and self-sufficient producers.
Fragmentation as measured by the number of plots also decreases with increasing agricultural
ability of the household. Thus, a system of extension and training is needed to facilitate land
consolidation.
In the same way as previously, total differentiation of both sides of expressions (3-6 or 6’)
















 <  0
Expression (A13) implies that if land is more fragmented the household will operate less land.
This also means that small-sized farms are likely to be more fragmented.



















Equations (A14 and A15) imply that households who rent in land will rent in less the more
fragmented the land. On the other hand, households who rent out land will rent out more the
more fragmented the land37
Recall equations (A7) and (A13):
α ∂
∂A





 <  0,





Equation (A16) implies that the number of plots is strictly decreasing in agricultural
production ability of the household. A system of extension and training may be needed to
facilitate land consolidation.
Case 3: farm land operated by the household is strictly decreasing in transaction costs
associated with the credit market, T1, the market for land use rights, T2, and land
fragmentation, T3. The number of plots, N increases as the above mentioned transaction costs
(T1, T2, and T3) increase. The amount of land rented in and out decreases with increasing
transaction costs for land rental, T2.













 <  0
Expression (A17) implies that an increase in the credit transaction cost decreases the
operating farm size. Households have an incentive to increase farm areas if the transaction












Expression (A18) implies that the higher the credit transaction cost the lower the
investment of the household in inputs. Farmers may have no incentives to invest
inputs in agricultural production if the transaction costs are too high.
Assume that the amount borrowed money for the household is Kbor
and Kbor = [∑j (Pxi + T3) xij + (Ai – Ai)(r2 + T2) + w2 Lhi  - Ki]. Differentiation of both sides


























Expression (A19) implies that the farm household will borrow less money if the credit
transaction cost increases.










Expression (A20) implies that a household with a high capital endowment may be likely to
increase their operating land.38
In the same way, total differentiation of both sides of expressions (3-6 or 6’) with respect to













 > 0  for households who rent out land
Expression (A21) implies that households who rent out land will tend keep their land rather
than rent it out as the transaction cost increases.








Equation (A22) implies that the amount of rented out land is strictly decreasing in transaction
costs or households who rent out land will rent out less land as the transaction cost increases.
For households who rent in land:
 (A23 )  ∑
∂a
∂T 2





 < 0 
Expression (A23) implies that households who rent in will operate less land as the transaction
cost increases or household has reduced incentives to rent in more.












Equation (A24) implies that the amount of rented in land is strictly decreasing in transaction
costs or households who rent in land will rent less land as the transaction cost increases.
In the same way, solving for ∑
∂a
∂T 3
 by Cramer’s rule, yields:
(A25)   ∑
∂a
∂T 3









Expressions (A25 and A26) imply that the higher the transaction costs associated with
land fragmentation the smaller the farm areas operated by the household and the





































Equation (A27) implies that all three transaction costs associated with the credit market, the
market for land use rights and land fragmentation are strictly increasing in the number of
plots. Land consolidation may be more active if these transaction costs decrease.39
Case 4: the farm land operated by the household is strictly decreasing in off-farm
wages. The amount of land rented in also decreases while the amount of land rented
out increases in relation to off-farm wages. If households who rented in continue to
rent in land, an increase of the given wage for off-farm employment may increase
land transacted in the rental market. This leads to a decrease in the equilibrium rental
rate which will make everybody better off. Therefore, an increase in opportunities for
off-farm jobs may be a key policy to encourage an active market for land use rights
and land accumulation as well as agricultural production in general.
Using the same procedure, total differentiation of both sides of (3-6 or 6’) with respect to the











Expression (A28) implies that household may reduce operating farm land when off-farm
wages increase. Farmers may leave their land more often if more opportunities for off-farm
jobs are available.








Equation (A29) implies that for those who still rent out land, the amount of rented out land
will be more as the off-farm job wage increases.
If it is assumed that the opportunities for off-farm jobs will not affect those households who
rented in, an increase in the wage, w1 will lead to a greater supply of land and the rental rate
will decrease. To show this the derivation of Deininger and Jin (2003) will be used.
Let 
(A30) Ain = Ain (α, p, w1
in, r2, T2) be the aggregate rent-in curve, and
(A31) Aout = Aout (α, p, w1
out, r2, T2) be the aggregate rent-out curve.
Thus:
(A32) Ain = Aout
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out  < 040
Expression (A35) implies that the equilibrium rental rate for land decreases as the wage rate
increases.41
Appendix C: Risk Estimation
In thsi appendix a summary is provided of the model developed by Blarel et al. (1992). It is
assumed that the yield for farmer i on plot j is given by
(A36) Qij/aij = (yo + µ) + (hi + ηi) + (kij + ϕij)
Where: Qij is the output of the jth plot of household i; aij is the area of plot j of household i; yo
is the village average yield for all plots and households; µ is a random village-level effect; hi
is a fixed household effect; ηi is a random household effect; kij is a fixed effect of plots; and
ϕij is a random plot effect.
It is assumed that random effects are independent of each other. This means that E(µ ηi) = 0;
E(µ ϕij) = 0; and E(ηi ϕij) = 0 for all i and j. In addition, co-variances between  ηi and ηi*, ϕij
and ϕi*j* (or E(ηi ηi*) and E(ϕij ϕi*j*) respectively) are equal zero for all i ≠ i




* are also denoted as i (household) and j (plot), respectively).
Total farm output is
(A36) ∑j Qij =  ∑j aj [ (yo + µ) + (hi + ηi) + (kij + ϕij)]
= [ (yo + µ) + (hi + ηi)] A + ∑j aj (kij + ϕij)
where A is farm area and equal to ∑j aj
The mean of output would be
(A37) E (∑j Qij) = (yo + hi) A + ∑j aj kij
The variance is
(A38) Var (∑j Qij) = A


















The expression can be written as
(A39) Var (∑j Qij/A) = Var(µ) + Var(ηi)  + (1 – S) Var(ϕij)
or Y = α0 + α1 X + U
where Y =  Var [(∑jQij)/Ai] = variance of farm output
α0 = Var(µ)
α1 = Var(ϕij)
U =  Var(ηi)
X = (1 – S) and S is Simpson’s index of land fragmentation.
The expression (A39) implies that the variance of the household output is linearly decreasing
as land fragmentation measured by Simpson’s index, S increases.